Muni-Funds: Exempt-Interest Dividends and the Feasibility of Underwriting Fee Recapture by unknown
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 19 | Issue 3 Article 4
Muni-Funds: Exempt-Interest Dividends and the
Feasibility of Underwriting Fee Recapture
Copyright c 1978 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Muni-Funds: Exempt-Interest Dividends and the Feasibility of Underwriting Fee Recapture, 19 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 519 (1978), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol19/iss3/4
NOTES
MUNI-FUNDS: EXEMPT-INTEREST DIVIDENDS AND THE
FEASIBILITY OF UNDERWRITING FEE RECAPTURE
Section 2137 of the Tax Reform Act of 19761 enables certain in-
vestment companies to distribute as "exempt-interest dividends"
the interest received on tax exempt bonds. 2 The provision permits
the creation of incorporated mutual funds3 capable of "passing
through" the tax exempt interest received on municipal bonds and
other government securities.' Prior to section 2137's adoption,
closed-end unit investment trusts5 and municipal bond limited
1. Public L. No. 94-455, § 2137, 90 Stat. 1930 (1976). Section 2137 is codified at I.R.C. §§
103(f), 265, 852.
2. Section 2137(c) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, I.R.C. § 852(b)(5), provides in pertinent
part: "If, at the close of each quarter of its taxable year, at least 50 percent of the value...
of the total assets of the regulated investment company consists of [state and local govern-
ment] obligations . . . such company shall be qualified to pay exempt-interest dividends
.. . to its shareholders." The section provides further that an exempt-interest dividend
"shall be treated by shareholders. . . as an item of interest excludable from gross income."
Id. § 852(b)(5)(B).
3. Mutual funds, a type of investment company, consist of pooled liquid assets controlled
by an external advisor, which, in return for selecting and managing the investments, receives
a fee. The discussion in this Note will be limited to an examination of the most common fund,
the diversified, open-end investment company. A diversified, open-end company is one that
"invest[s] in the securities of many different issuers" and that "issue[s] 'redeemable'
securities [such as] securities whose holders have a right to obtain from the company their
proportionate share of the compan[y']s net assets or the cash equivalent." HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT OF SEC ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as PPII.
4. With certain exceptions, the Internal Revenue Code excludes from gross income interest
on "the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United States, or any political
subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the District of Columbia." I.R.C. § 103(a)(1).
Regulated investment companies theoretically are taxed to place "investment company
shareholders essentially in the same position as if they owned directly the securities held by
the fund." Taxation of Interest on Debt Obligations Issued by State and Local Governments
and on Witholding Federal Income Tax on Interest and Dividend Income, Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on Bond Interest Taxation].
5. "Unit investment trusts sell redeemable interests in fixed portfolios of specified securi-
ties." PPI, supra note 3, at 7. Close-end unit investment trusts, which first appeared in 1961,
may pass through tax exempt interest to investors provided the portfolio remains fixed. I.R.C.
§ 852(d). From their advent, managed municipal bond funds, or "muni-funds," have been
competing vigorously with unit investment trusts. Phalon, Tax-Free Mutual Funds vs. Unit
Trusts, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1977, at 27, col. 1. Phalon notes that in 1977 the marketability
of managed funds was slightly better than the marketability of unit trusts. Nevertheless, the
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partnerships6 were the only investment entities similar to mutual
funds capable of passing through tax exempt interest. Despite the
attractiveness of this exclusive feature, the general public, however,
did not use these investment vehicles extensively because following
the initial purchase of bonds, neither entity managed the portfolio.
By contrast, municipal bond mutual funds, "muni-funds," which
provide post-purchase management, received an enthusiastic public
response. Within a month after the adoption of the Tax Reform Act,
eleven muni-funds were formed,7 and by July, 1977, $1.5 billion had
been invested in the new bond funds.8
One factor prompting the enactment of the pass-through provi-
sion was the financial difficulties experienced by equity mutual
funds in recent years, precipitated by "[perhaps] one of the biggest
mass withdrawals from equity securities since the Great Crash of
'29." After a spectacular growth, the popularity of mutual funds
peaked in 1968, and then slipped for a few years before peaking
again in 1972.10 In 1974, however, the funds lost more than one-
two top competitors produced yields of 5.1% (managed funds) and 6.1% (unit trusts); the
management fee charged by the incorporated mutual fund accounted for most of the differ-
ence in yield.
6. A 1966 revenue ruling permitted short-lived limited partnerships to invest in municipal
bonds and to pass through the tax exempt interest to their partners. Rev. Rul. 66-187, 1966-
2 C.B. 246. The limited partnership, however, is not a particularly covenient means of invest-
ment; only two were formed before September, 1976, when "muni-funds" were first organized.
Sloane, Personal Finance, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1976, at 26, col. 5. While testifying on a
related matter, a spokesman for the Investment Company Institute, the national association
of the mutual fund industry, stated that the use of limited partnerships to convey tax exempt
interest was "awkward and difficult." Hearings on Bond Interest Taxation, supra note 4, at
112.
7. Phalon, Mutual Funds Confront the Great Drain, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1976, § 3, at 7,
col. 2. According to a listing by the Investment Company Institute (ICI), 11 funds were
operating by December 20, 1976 and 18 other funds had applied for registration with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Letter from the ICI to Financial Editors (Dec. 22,
1976). By July, 1977, 28 funds existed, and an additional 17 were in registration proceedings.
Bus. WEEK, July 25, 1977, at 127, 132.
8. Bus. WEEK, July 25, 1977, at 127, 132.
9. Phalon, Mutual Funds Confront the Great Drain, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1976, § 3, at 1,
col. 1. In a year-end story on mutual funds, Business Week noted that "the industry's hopes
in 1977 ride on the new tax-exempt bond" but that "most [fund managers] glumly concede
that even a strong showing in 1977 will not stop the industry's continuing contraction." Bus.
WEEK, Dec. 27, 1976, at 128, 130. During the first eleven months of 1976, the mutual fund
industry experienced 14 consolidations or liquidations. Id. at 128.
10. The net assets of mutual funds reached $52.7 billion in 1968 before falling in 1969 and
1970 to $48.3 and $47.6 billion, respectively. Resuming an upward trend in 1971, the net assets
reached a new high of $59.8 billion in 1972. ICI, 1976 MUTUAL FUND FAcT BOOK 7.
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quarter of the net assets they had held a year earlier and thereafter
have enjoyed only sluggish popularity."
This severe setback of mutual funds cannot be explained entirely
by the nation's economic recession in the mid-1970's and its con-
comitant equity drain. Their troubles also indicate that investors
are "skeptical of the 'professional management' that the mutual
funds have tried to provide at fees that run into hundreds of millions
of dollars a year."12 Whatever the source of these problems, the
difficulties of this powerful financial sector clearly motivated, in
part, the adoption of the pass-through provision.
Section 2137, then, was enacted to promote investment in mutual
funds, but the legislative history of its passage discloses Congress'
failure to consider several problems associated with the develop-
ment of municipal bond mutual funds. 3 The rapid growth experi-
11. The net assets of mutual funds, which had dropped to $46.5 billion in 1973, fell further
in 1974 to $34.1 billion. These figures exclude the assets of those "money market" funds that
deal in such short-term securities as Treasury bills, bank certificates of deposit, and commer-
cial paper, and include those that manage conventional securities. Id. The total assets of
conventional funds at the end of 1976 equalled $47.5 billion, a $5.3 billion increase from the
previous year. According to the ICI, this result reflected both the "net cash flow of money
into bond funds and the increase in assets of equity-oriented funds" caused by the general
rise in stock prices. ICI, 1977 MurruAL FUND FACT BOOK 4.
The value of annual distributions to shareholders of net realized long-term capital gains
and income dividends provides an index of mutual fund performance reflecting more varia-
bles than does the net asset index. In the late 1960's, capital gains distributions exceeded
those of investment income; in the preceding 10 years, both types of distributions had been
roughly equivalent. In 1970, however, capital gains distributions shrank from $2.5 billion to
$922.1 million; by 1971 they decreased to $775.5 million, an amount slightly more than one-
half the total investment income distributions. After a period of growth in 1972-1973, capital
gains distributions sank in 1974 to $484.3 million and in 1975 to $219.2 million. These distri-
butions then increased in 1976 to $470.9 million.
Net investment income represents the distributions and interest on a fund's portfolio, less
its operating expenses; capital gains distributions, however, are indicative of long-term profits
realized by the fund on its sale of portfolio securities. Id. at 14.
As a result of the preceding years' setbacks, in 1976, shareholder accounts in conventional
funds dropped to pre-1968 levels. Another revealing figure in 1976 iwas the 15.2% rate of
redemption of average net assets, representing the highest figure ever obtained and exceeding
the 1975 rate by 5.5%. Id. at 20.
12. Phalon, supra note 9, at 1, col. 3.
13. The initial House bill, which later became the Tax Reform Act of 1976, contained no
section similar to § 2137. The ICI urged both the Senate Finance Committee and the House
Ways and Means Committee to permit mutual funds to pass through tax exempt interest.
Although the possibility of reform of the tax exempt system was under consideration, the ICI
suggested that the amendment be adopted "whether or not the Internal Revenue Code is
amended to permit state and local governments at their option to issue taxable bonds since
large amounts of existing tax-exempt bonds would remain outstanding and many issuers
might well elect to offer new bonds on a tax-exempt basis." Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings
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enced by the muni-funds warrants a more careful analysis of these
problems. This Note will examine two major problems associated
with the operation of muni-funds: their effect on the equity and
cost-efficiency of the federal tax system, and the duty to offset un-
derwriting fees against advisors' commissions. Consideration also
will be given to the necessity for regulatory changes if muni-funds
are expected to recapture underwriting fees.
THE EFFECT OF THE OPERATION OF MUNI-FUNDS ON THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM
Since the adoption of the sixteenth amendment 4 and the enact-
ment of the first income tax laws exempting municipal bond inter-
est from taxation, 5 "the Treasury Department has, more or less
continuously been seeking to eliminate the tax exemption on munic-
ipal bonds."'" This exemption has been criticized 7 because it not
on H.R. 10612 Before the Comm. on Finance of the Senate, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3575 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings] (supplemental memorandum on behalf of the ICI).
In May, 1976, the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Roderick M.
Hills, announced his support for the measure. While emphasizing that his views did not
necessarily reflect those of the Commission, Hills stated that "[the Commission] supports
the ICI on the proposal." ICI, MUTUAL FUNDS FORUM 17 (June 1976).
Though neither the House bill nor the version reported by the Senate Finance Committee
included the ICI proposal, it was introduced as an amendment on the Senate floor. Sen.
Amend. 2035, 122 CONG. Rac. S13714 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976). During the abbreviated debate,
Senator Percy informed his colleagues that the Treasury Department did not object to the
proposal, id. at S13715; the amendment was added by a voice vote. Id.
Earlier, the Senate Finance Committee had proposed an amendment similar to that ulti-
mately enacted in 1976, § 42 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958. The proposal won
approval in the Senate but failed in the Conference Committee. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 61-63, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4850-52. In the Senate
Finance Committee Report, Senator Paul Douglas criticized the provision: "Until such time
as a broad approach to the solution to these problems [of the propriety of the exemption]
can be provided, it is unwise further to entrench in the Federal tax law the existing preferen-
tial treatment." Id. at 264, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5051. The
conferees described the amendment and noted that the "Senate recedes." CONF. REP. No.
2632, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5066.
14. The Sixteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
15. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 11B, 38 Stat. 168. The current code exempts municipal
bond interest under I.R.C. § 103.
16. Morris, Tax Exemption for State and Local Bonds, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 526, 526
(1974). See also J. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 190 (1965).
17. See generally Fortune, Tax Exemption: Issues and Alternatives, 1973 NEw ENGLAND
ECON. REV. 17; Gardner, Tax Immune Bond, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (1940); Gelfand, Tax
Exempt Securities and the Doctrine of Reciprocal Immunity, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 173 (1959);
only primarily benefits individuals in high income tax brackets but
also is cost inefficient. The impact of the operation of muni-funds
on the efficiency and equity of the federal tax system, though, is
unclear. Undoubtedly, section 2137 will affect pre-existing invest-
ment patterns, but its repercussions may not be those anticipated
by its sponsors.
The.Equity Problem
Traditionally, institutions such as commercial banks and fire and
casualty insurance companies have made large investments in the
municipal bond market. 8 In contrast, the household sector, al-
though growing in importance, has accounted only for approxi-
mately one-third of the municipal bonds purchased.'9 Individuals
have been discouraged from investing directly in tax exempt bonds
primarily because the denominations in which most bonds are is-
sued require investors to purchase at least $5,000 of securities. 0
Moreover, substantial knowledge of the bond market and inclusion
in a relatively high income tax bracket are practically prerequisites
to direct investment." Consequently, wealthy persons comprise the
principal individual purchasers of municipal bonds.
22
Morris, Exemptions For State and Local Bonds, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 526 (1974); Mortori
& Bliss, Taxation of municipal Bond Interest-"Interesting Speculation" and One Step
Forward, 44 NoTEE DAME LAW. 191 (1968); Ratchford, Revenue Bonds and Tax Immunity, 7
NAT'L TAX J. 40 (1954); Note, The Continuing Debate Over the Municipal Bond Exemption:
Time For a New Approach By Reformists, 25 SYAcusE L. REv. 953 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Continuing Debate].
For recent discussions of the exemption's effectiveness as an indirect subsidy of local
borrowing costs, see J. PSTERsON, JOINT EcONOAIc COMMITrEE OF CONGRESS, 94TH CONG., 2D
SESS., CHANGING CONDITIONS IN THE MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 55-58
(Joint Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as CHANGING CONDITIONS]; STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., TAXABLE BOND ALTERNATIVES FOR
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1-9 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as TAXABLE BOND
ALTERNATIVES].
18. CHANGING CONDITIONS, supra note 17, at 35.
19. Id. From 1974-1975, however, individual investors purchased 60% of the net new supply
of municipal bonds. Id.
20. 122 CONG.-REc. S13715 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Percy).
21. See text accompanying note 28 infra.
22. "The average marginal tax rate for municipal bond owners has recently been estimated
to be approximately 55 percent. . . . [A]bout 70 percent of municipal bonds held by house-
holds are owned by units with incomes of $50,000 or more." CHANGING CONDITIONS, supra note
17, at 39 (footnote omitted). According to data compiled by the Investment Company Insti-
tute, before the end of 1976, the average shareholder's muni-funds account amounted to
$12,000. ICI, News Release 2 (May 3, 1977).
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Muni-funds were designed specifically to ameliorate the burdens
upon individuals entering the tax exempt bond market.2 3 To date,
though, muni-funds have been only mildly successful in eroding
these barriers. Admittedly, the minimum muni-funds investment,
which ranges from $1,000 to $5,000, has been substantially re-
duced.24 Furthermore, by providing for the management of the
funds' assets, muni-funds have reduced the amount of prior knowl-
edge necessary to invest in the bond market. Nevertheless, the
major barrier to private purchase of municipal bonds, inclusion in
a relatively high tax bracket,'25 remains. Unless an individual main-
tains a sufficiently high personal income, he will be unable to bene-
fit from a municipal bond investment not only because these bonds
have lower initial yields than corporate issues, 2 but also because the
rate of return on an investment in a muni-fund is diminished even
further through the assessment of management fees.Y At the current
rates of return on bonds, an individual must be in the twenty-eight
percent marginal tax bracket before a direct individual investment
in municipal bonds would be more profitable than a comparable
purchase of corporate bonds.28
23. When introducing the amendment that would become § 2137, Senator Percy stated:
"it is effectively impossible for investors with limited resources and experience to engage in
trading in these securities. This amendment allows small investors to invest in tax-free bonds
with less individual risk and lower capital requirements, by sharing in a fund with a diversi-
fied portfolio under professional management." 122 CONG. REC. S13714 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
1976). The ICI presented similar arguments before the Senate Finance Comittee. 1975 Hear-
ings, supra note 13, at 3575.
24. Phalon, Personal Finance: New Tax Laws Spawning Municipal Bond Funds, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1976, at 69, col. 2. Unit investment trusts also required minimum investments
of $1,000 to $5,000 in the fall of 1976. Phalon, Personal Finance, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1976,
at 26, col.4.
25. See note 22 supra.
26. During the week ending March 10, 1978, corporate bonds rated Aa averaged an interest
rate of 8.5%, and 20 municipal bonds that had beeri active on the market averaged 5.58%.
Bus. WEEK, March 27, 1978, at 79.
27. Management fees often are set at one-half percent of the fund's total assets. See note
57 infra.
28. Dreyfus Corp., Dreyfus Tax Exempt Bond Fund, Inc. (1976) (brochure tax chart); see,
e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., How Technical Analysis Can Help You
(June, 1978).
For example, an investor in the seventy percent tax bracket who purchases a $1,000 munici-
pal bond yielding six percent, rather than a corporate bond yielding eight percent, would
receive a tax benefit of thirty-six dollars. Although the corporate bond would yield interest
of eighty dollars, fifty-six dollars would be paid in taxes, leaving income of twenty-four
dollars. The municipal bond would yield sixty dollars of nontaxable interest. By contrast, an
individual in the thirty percent tax bracket who made the same investment decision would
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Clearly, the mere influx of individual investment in the munici-
pal bond market alone will not correct the inequitable distribution
of the tax benefits created by the municipal bond interest exemp-
tion. Inherent in the structure of the exemption are the dispro-
portionately greater benefits to those persons in high income tax
brackets, a phenomenom that will continue regardless of the num-
ber of new investors attracted to the municipal bond market by the
existence of muni-funds.
The Cost-Efficiency Problem
Municipal bond purchasers generally realize a net tax savings on
their investments, despite the securities' lower interest rates. This
effect is the consequence of a system that inefficiently promotes
investment in debt obligations of state and local government: the
federal government loses more tax revenue because of the interest
exemption than state and local governments save from issuing low
interest tax exempt bonds. The magnitude of the problem of money
loss, or leakage, appears in a report by the Joint Economic Com-
mitttee of Congress, which states that "in fiscal 1976, of the approxi-
mately $4.8 billion in foregone Treasury receipts [resulting from the
municipal bond interest exemption], $3.5 billion was passed to
State and local borrowers in reduced interest costs and $1.3 billion
was retained by investors."29
If muni-funds attract permanent new investors into the bond
market, the expanded sales probably will cause an increase in the
overall amount of leakage, but the loss per unit of borrowed money
will decline. An increased demand created by muni-funds could be
expected to prompt an expansion in the size and number of munici-
pal offerings,"0 which in turn would promote a proportionate in-*
receive only a four dollar tax benefit. The latter investor would receive interest of eighty
dollars and sixty dollars on the corporate and municipal bonds respectively; however, his
after-tax income from the corporate investment, on which he would have to pay taxes of
twenty-four dollars, would be fifty-six dollars.
29. CHANGING CONDMONS, supra note 17, at 56. In analyzing assumptions made in estimat-
ing foregone revenues and reduced borrowing costs, the report states that "the subsidy is more
efficient than it appears." Id. at 57. The ratio of foregone revenues to interest costs saved may
reflect inaccurately the true relationship between these figures. Factors unique to municipal
bonds cause their rates to be higher than otherwise would be necessary to attract investors
seeking tax exempt income. In addition, if taxable municipal bonds replace tax exempt
bonds, other tax shelters then would become more competitive, which would cause interest
rates to rise. Id. at 56-57.
30. In recent years, state and local governments, relying more on borrowed funds, have
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crease in the number of bonds from which leakage occurs. If the new
muni-funds investors are in the lower tax brackets, however, less
leakage per unit would occur because the net tax savings from mu-
nicipal bond investments decrease as a function of the individual's
tax bracket.3'
The Effect of Section 2137 on Pending Reforms of the Municipal
Bond Interest Exemption
Not only may section 2137 fail to improve the equity and cost-
efficiency of the federal tax system, it also may delay or prevent the
adoption of major reforms designed to alleviate problems inherent
in the present treatment of municipal bond interest. 1 Before the
adoption of section 2137, Congress had been encouraged to consider
the enactment of a taxable bond option that would enable munici-
increased their total indebtedness from $71 billion in 1960 to $207 billion in 1974. CHANGING
CONDITIONS, supra note 17, at 4. By January 1, 1977, the operation of muni-funds apparently
accelerated this trend. Perhaps anticipating the demand muni-funds would create, states and
localities offered a substantial number of new issues. In one week $625 million of municipal
obligations were to be sold. Prices Skid Further Amid Rising Anxiety Over Effect of Demo-
crats' Spending Plan, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1977, at 14, col. 2. The resulting superabundance
of municipal bonds contributed to "one of the severest market declines in recent years" in
the general bond market. Id. Before the end of 1977 a record $44.9 billion of new municipal
bond issues were offered for sale. This amount exceeded by 33% the prior record established
in 1976. Much of this volume might have included financing to replace old issues. Finance
Trends, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Jan. 16, 1978, at 68. This initial response by state and
local governments indicates that any spurring of demand by muni-funds will be matched by
an increase in municipal offerings.
31. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
32. Attempts have been made to reform, rather than to eliminate, the interest exemption
because of the strong argument that elimination would be unconstitutional. In Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), the Supreme Court held that municipal bond
interest was immune from federal taxation, noting that a contrary holding, in effect, would
subject state and local governments to taxation by the federal government. Id. at 583-86.
"[Tihe United States [has] no power under the Constitution to tax either instrumentalities
or the property of a State." Id. at 586.
One commentator recently suggested that the Court had "ostensib[ly] limit[ed] . . .
immunity to those devices which sustain government functions that are essential to the
existence of the state and local government." Continuing Debate, supra note 17, at 957-58
(footnote omitted). According to the author, if the federal government could offset any loss
"in revenue from bond sales resulting from elimination of the exemption," the bond interest
exemption could be eliminated constitutionally. Id. at 958.
33. For a review of taxable bond proposals introduced through 1973, see Continuing De-
bate, supra note 17, at 958 n. 27. In 1976, three congressional bills proposed a taxable bond
option. Two bills would have established a 40% federal interest subsidy for taxable municipal
bonds, see S.2800, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 11214, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), and
one would have allowed a 35% subsidy. See H.R. 12774,94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). President
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pal issuers of taxable bonds to receive federal subsidies covering the
higher interest costs associated with those securities. The relative
instability of the municipal bond market in the 1970's34 created
doubts among many governmental bodies about the marketability
of untaxed municipal bonds. Consequently, the subsidized, or taxa-
ble, bond option, which had been opposed previously by those fear-
ful of increased federal control over local financing mechanisms,
met less resistance35 than in the past. 6
The probablity of passing such a bill, though, has been reduced
by the development of muni-funds. The increased demand for mu-
nicipal bonds stirred by the muni-funds undoubtedly will enhance
state and local governments' ability to market tax-free securities.
Moreover, because such legislation would reduce the number of
exempt-interest bond issues available for purchase, the mutual fund
industry would oppose a taxable bond option. The lobbying efforts
of this important sector of the financial industry, combined with
increased resistance from local governments, could reduce signifi-
cantly the chances for the adoption of a taxable bond option provi-
sion."
Carter submitted a taxable bond option proposal to Congress in January, 1978. See [1978]
SEc. REG. & L. REP. (B&A) No. 437, at A-7 (Jan. 25, 1978).
34. Several factors caused the instability of the bond market during the 1970's. The most
important of these included the sensitivity of commercial banks to periods of tight monetary
policy when their need for liquidity increased, the availability of alternative tax shelters, and
the unrelated financial losses suffered by fire and casualty insurance companies which coinci-
dentally had invested heavily in municipal bonds. CHANGING CONDIONS, supra note 17, at
36-38.
35. For an example of the municipalities' increased interest in the bond option bills, see
Hearings on Bond Interest Taxation, supra note 4, at 54 (testimony of J. Peterson, National
Governors Conference Center for Policy Research and Analysis).
36. Following a 1973 Treasury Department proposal for a taxable bond option, local and
state governments issued statements of opposition, contending that "the Federal Government
. . . would use an option to entrap State and local governments and then would withdraw
tax exemption, leaving them at the mercy of the direct subsidy program." CHANGING
CONDITIONS, supra note 17, at 63. In 1975, attention focused on'New York City's problems
and proposals for direct federal credit assistance. Id. at 63-64. By 1976, however, the Treasury
Department again proposed the taxable bond option subsidy as a method for minimizing
state and local borrowing costs. Id. at 64; TAXABLE BoND ALTERNATiVS, supra note 17, at 10.
Although the proposal is gaining greater acceptance, municipalities still resist taxable bond
option bills and probably remain the strongest adversaries to such a change. When testifying
on taxable option bills, the Municipal Finance Officers Association (MFOA), a borrower's
organization, stated that it would only support legislation that maintained "freedom from
Federal controls, . . . savings on interest costs, . . . [and] retention of viable competitive
private marketing channels." Hearings on Bond Interest Taxation, supra note 4, at 54 (testi-
mony of Andre Blum, MFOA).
37. One observer has suggested, however, that the muni-funds may contribute to the de-
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Thus, municipal bond mutual funds are popular and permanent
additions to the investment market and must be considered in any
new studies concerning the potential reform of the tax treatment
accorded municipal bond interest. Given the apparent permanence
of muni-funds, their operation poses a problem affecting all mutual
funds: whether the fund advisors's fee should be offset with under-
writing commissions earned by the advisor's affiliates on new issues
sold to the fund. This issue is of particular concern to municipal
bonds funds because certain provisions in the laws regulating mu-
tual funds must be amended to provide specific exemptions for
muni-funds if, as has been held, the funds have a duty to recoup
underwriting commissions. To the extent that muni-funds proceed
to offset and thus lower their advisory fees whenever feasible, inves-
tors may receive slightly larger returns on their investment. This
result would permit persons whose low income tax bracket presently
prevents them from investing profitably in tax exempt municipal
bonds to enter that market, thus simultaneously decreasing the
equity and leakage problems associated with tax exempt securities.
OFFSETTING ADVISORY FEES WITH RECAPTURED UNDERWRITING
COMMISSIONS
Any inquiry into whether a fund advisor should offset his fee by
recouping or recapturing underwriting commissions must be made
within the context of the statutes, the case law, and the regulations
generally affecting muni-funds. Such an analysis, therefore, pro-
vides an opportunity for examining the legal environment in which
these new funds operate. More specifically, the following discussion
focuses on four issues: whether offsetting is feasible; whether it is
desirable from a policy standpoint; whether the advisor's fiduciary
duty requires him to recoup underwriting commissions; and
whether, apart from any duty, such recoupment is permitted by the
statutes and case law.
mise of tax exempt bonds by informing the public that the municipal bond interest exemption
"is the most expensive subsidy we have in our tax system." Belliveau, The darker side of the
muni fund boom, INsTmrtrTONAL INVzSToR, January, 1977, at 138 (presenting the ideas of John
Heimann, former New York State Commissioner of Banks). Heimann warned that, if inter-
est rates are lowered, muni-fund growth may encourage state and local officials to enter the
bond market even though they might overextend the capacities of their jurisdiction. Id.
Moreover, Heimann suggested that muni-fund managers would be dissuaded from predict-
ing interest rates and from actively managing portfolios. Id.
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The Feasibility of Underwriting Commission Recapture
Before the desirability or legal necessity of the offsetting/
recapturing procedure can be analyzed, the feasibility of the pro-
cess must be determined. A mutual furfd, consisting of a group of
investors who pool their resources, is managed by a professional
advisor. The advisor may be a board of trustees, an employee of the
fund, or an independent company, but his services usually are more
akin to those provided by employees or by a board of directors rather
than by a separate entity. Large investment organizations often act
as advisors to affiliated funds with diversified investment objec-
tives. Of course, these organizations also conduct operations in other
types of investment activities, such as brokerage, dealing, and un-
derwriting. Thus, recouping becomes feasible when a fund advisor
is affiliated with an underwriter.
Recouping is possible, though, not only because advisors and
underwriters might be affiliated but also because for large purchases
funds pay underwriters commissions that typically are higher than
necessary to cover costs and yield a reasonable profit. Underwriters
earn commissions when they sell at a fixed rate of return stocks or
bonds that they have purchased from the issuer at a fixed discount
from the price quoted dealers or public customers. For example, the
underwriter in the initial syndicate might buy at $99 per share and
sell at $99.50 to a dealer in a selected selling group. The dealer in
turn receives a "selling concession" when he sells at $99.75 to a
retailer-dealer. The customer ultimately buys the stock from the
retailer at $100 per share without the benefit of a discount for vol-
ume purchasing. Thus, the economies of a large-scale sale to a fund
may provide an affiliate of the fund's advisor, who has participated
at some stage in this underwriting process, with an excessive com-
mission. In a process described as recapturing the underwriting
commission, this excessive amount could be applied to offset the
compensation received by the fund's advisor."
The Desirability of Recapture
Several policy issues pertaining to the manner in which under-
writing commissions are set are relevant to a discussion of the recap-
38. The adoption of this process was urged by the plaintiffs in Papilsky v. Berndt, [1976-
1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 95,627, at 90,128 (1976). See notes 112-17
infra & accompanying text.
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ture of commission and offsetting advisory fees. Fixed by private
agreement between the issuer and the syndicate,39 the commissions
reflect little sensitivity to the reduced costs made possible by vol-
ume sales to entities such as mutual funds;"0 consequently, under-
writers often receive more compensation than necessary to cover
their costs and yield a reasonable profit.
This situation is similar to the experience with fixed brokerage
commissions," which normally included extra compensation then
used to pay indirectly the costs of research and the sale of the fund's
shares. When fixed brokerage rates were abolished, however, mutual
fund managers began seeking new circuitous methods of paying for
these services.42 Increasingly, brokers performing services for funds
were compensated through underwriting commissions.43 Sometimes,
39. 3 L. Loss, SECURTIES REGULATION 1615 (1961). Some debate exists over whether the
underwriting commissions, or spreads, actually are fixed. An attorney for the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has indicated that the SEC questions whether the underwri-
ter's ability to maintain fixed spreads has been limited by the use of swap arrangements
whereby a broker-dealer agrees to buy securities from a customer if the latter will purchase
securities that the former is offering for sale. Belliveau, How institutions are still getting
something for nothing, INsTrrUIONAL INVESTOR, April, 1976, at 32-33. Regarding this practice,
the SEC lawyer posed the question: " 'If these swaps [involving payment by the broker-
dealer of more than a fair market value for the customer's securities] do exist. . . then aren't
brokers essentially giving an institutional buyer a choice between getting a discount on the
new issue by doing a swap or paying the offering price and getting research?' "Id. at 33. The
Belliveau article states that "should the SEC decide the underwriting spreads are not fixed,
but really quite negotiable, the use of designated orders to pay for research might raise some
of the same fiduciary questions as does paying up on listed trades (nor would they be pro-
tected by Section 28(E), the amendment to the Securities Act that allows paying up for
research)." Id. at 32.
In United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), a New York district court
determined that the underwriting agreements of 17 investment banking firms fixed prices;
nevertheless, the firms' actions did not violate per se the antitrust laws. Id. at 699. According
to the court, the syndicate system served "its purpose so well" that the "eggs cannot now be
unscrambled." Id. at 688. For a review of the SEC's investigation into fixed spreads and resale
price maintenance and for a discussion of Morgan, see 3 L. Loss, supra, at 1615-22.
40. For information concerning the relationship between the costs of underwriting and the
volume of sales, see HUNT, WITniAMs, & DONALDSON, BAsIC BUSINESS FINANCE 354 (1974). The
underwriting system differs somewhat from the brokerage system in that an underwriter not
only performs a marketing service but also undertakes an insurance function. Unlike the costs
of marketing, the insurance risk assumed by the underwriting syndicate is relatively insensi-
tive to economies of scale.
41. See notes 63-82 infra & accompanying text.
42. See Belliveau, supra note 39, at 29.
43. In a notice to its members, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1977), has proposed changes, designed to
halt abuses in the underwriting process related to the use of selling concessions, discounts,
and allowances. NASD, Notice to Members 77-31, Sept. 23, 1977. The notice contains a
thorough description of the abuses.
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through a "designation of orders" scheme, fund managers, upon
purchase of large blocks of shares in a new issue, would arrange for
the payment of the underwriting commissions to specific brokers
either in the syndicate or in the post-underwriting selling group."
This designation is easiest, though, when the brokers performing
services for a fund coincidentally are members of the selling syndi-
cate. At the request of a fund-customer, an unaffiliated participat-
ing broker can be named to a syndicate by the managing under-
writer, thereby enabling the broker to receive designated com-
missions. This practice has led some brokers to form departments
solely to facilitate such transactions."
The use of designated orders presents several of the same prob-
lems that existed when fund managers used brokerage commissions
to pay indirectly for services. For example, a manager's actual costs
of transacting purchases for the fund still might remain hidden,
thereby facilitating excessive advisory fees." In addition, a fund
manager might purchase certain new issues at a time when a stock's
purchase price exceeds its true value solely for the purpose of desig-
nating orders to pay research debts.4"
44. Belliveau, supra note 39, at 29. Commissions can be routed to dealers as payment for
research through the use of the "bill and deliver" practice, a variation of the designated order.
The bill and deliver device involves the purchase of a block of securities by an institution,
which then requests that the commissions it pays be credited to several dealers, although the
institution is sent only one bill and receives only one security certificate. NASD, Notice to
Members 77-31, Sept. 23, 1977, at 14.
45. Belliveau, supra note 39, at 30.
46. When the shareholders contribute to the advisor's fee and to separate costs of portfolio
management, such as underwriting fees, they actually may be paying twice for some research
sevices. The advisor "obligates itself. . . to base its decisions on reasonably valid information
and to gather that information;" therefore, its acceptance of the entire management fee when
it has used fund-paid underwriting fees to purchase some research arguably is improper.
Note, Conflict of Interest in the Allocation of Mutual Fund Brokerage Business, 80 YALE L.
J. 372, 377 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Conflict of Interest]. Advisors argue that management
contracts impliedly contemplate the usage of brokerage commissions (and by analogy under-
writing fees) for corroborative research. Id. The contracts, however, are "rarely the products
of arm's length bargaining; whether or not they 'contemplate' corroborative research is largely
determined by adviser's fiat." Id. This critique, of course, undermines not only thelegitimacy
of using underwriting fees to pay for research but also the rationale behind statutorily allow-
ing the use of brokerage commissions to pay for research debts when the negotiated rates have
not eliminated excessive brokerage compensation completely. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(e)(1)
(Supp. 1977); Jordon, "Paying Up" For Research: A Regulatory and Legislative Analysis,
1975 DUKE L. J. 1103.
47. Attorneys from both the Securities Exchange Commission and the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers suspect that portfolio managers might be unable to determine
objectively whether to purchase a stock after it has been placed on the market or as a new
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Even if the cost savings created by the use of designated orders
inure to the benefit of the funds rather than their advisors, this
method of effecting economies from large volume purchases of new
issues is unavailable to noninstitutional buyers. Thus, purchasers
who are unable to participate in order designations or similar trans-
actions but who buy securities in large enough blocks to provide the
underwriter with some economies of scale have no means to recoup
the excessive compensation emanating from fixed underwriting fees.
Without study, an assessment of whether fund shareholders
would benefit more from recapture than from some other use of
excessive underwriting compensation would be speculative. Argua-
bly, funds should not pursue the uncertain benefits of recapture if
such efforts would upset their ability to participate in designated
order transactions and would deprive fund shareholders of the bene-
fits flowing from the designated order system. Moreover, an altera-
tion in the present system of underwriting fees fixed by private
agreement between an underwriter and an issuer would obviate the
need for recapture as well as the current practice of designating
orders to recoup excessive underwriting commissions.
Consistent with its opposition to fixed brokerage commissions,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) may question the
lack of negotiated underwriting commissions. For example, the SEC
was instrumental in persuading the New York Stock Exchange to
liberalize volume discounts in its rate structure, a change that con-
tributed to the demise of customer directed give-ups. Moreover, in
regard to the recapture of brokerage commissions, proposed rule
10b-10 and rule 19b-2, enacted under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, reflected this same opposition to rate-fixing; the former
would impose on managers a fiduciary duty to undertake recapture
for their beneficiaries, and the latter prohibits fund managers from
exploiting the system of fee-fixing unless other investors are able to
do likewise. Following the abolition of rate-setting, the SEC stated:
"The existing commission rate structure had. . . led to distortions,
evasions, conflicts of interest and inefficiencies . . . . "I It com-
mented that because brokers often were compensated through such
devices as give-ups and reciprocity, methods analogous to desig-
nated orders, "managers [were] constantly tempted to direct the
issue (when the price often is higher) if the latter alternative provides a means to fund
research debts. Belliveau, supra note 39, at 33.
48. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11203 (Jan. 23, 1975), at 25.
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brokerage business of their beneficiaries to brokers who [would]
provide services for the benefit of the manager""9 rather than for the
fund.
Unlike commissions paid to brokers, however, those paid to un-
derwriters are established by private contract; thus, perhaps the
"public policy questions are not as compelling as they were with the
old fixed [brokerage] commissions.""0 In addition, underwriting
commissions have remained fixed despite legislative implementa-
tions of negotiable brokerage rates, suggesting that the public inter-
est is not contravened so obviously by privately fixed underwriting
commissions as by publicly set brokerage rates.
Decisive answers to the policy questions concerning the desirabil-
ity of underwriting recapture will be unavailable without further
study. As previously discussed, this issue, which is enmeshed within
the controversy surrounding separately fixed underwriting compen-
sation, could become moot if mutual funds and other large lot buy-
ers were able to negotiate their underwriting fees. Assuming that the
practice of fixing underwriting compensation by private agreement
between the issuer and the underwriter continues, however, the pos-
sibility of attempting recapture or of maintaining the current prac-
tices that permit fund advisors to utilize excessive cQmpensation
must be considered.
The Fiduciary Duty of Fund Managers to Recapture Underwriting
Commissions
Assuming the feasibility and desirability of underwriting fee re-
capture, the most important nonpolicy question is whether fund
managers have a duty to recapture. Resolution of this issue requires
an analysis of the statutes governing mutual funds and of the case
law developed recently and in the years before implementation of
negotiated brokerage commissions.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA),5' together with the
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 (ICAA),,52 princi-
pally regulate the mutual fund industry. Following the discovery of
practices in the mutual fund industry inimical to investors' inter-
49. Id. at 25 n. 42.
50. Belliveau, supra note 39, at 32.
51. Ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1970)).
52. Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (amending scattered sections in 15 U.S.C. § 80a
(1970)).
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ests,53 the ICA was designed to eliminate "outright dishonesty, man-
agerial self-dealing in securities and other types of property, un-
sound financial structures and immunity from liability for miscon-
duct." 54 The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, the
ICA's principal drafter, was less concerned with problems of
"managerial compensation, underwriting charges, and brokerage
commissions, [which] seemed . . . of secondary importance . . .
while the study was in progress." 5
Although the problem of compensation of mutual fund advisors
had been noted and studied extensively," not until the passage of
the ICAA 7 was management fee-setting made a matter of fiduciary
53. Report of the SEC On Investment Trusts and Investment Companies (1938-40). The
Report was issued in five parts and numerous supplements, some of which failed to reach
Congress until after the passage of the ICA. See generally North, A Brief History of Federal
Investment Company Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 677, 677-79 n. 7 (1969). For a history
of the ICA, see Barnard, Codification and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 22 Bus. LAW.
850 (1967); Farina, Freeman, & Webster, The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44
NOTRE DAME LAW. 736, 787-808 (1969); North, supra, at 680-84; PPI, supra note 3, at 63-72.
54. PPI, supra note 3, at 9-10.
55. Id. at 65.
56. Several major studies were performed between 1958 and 1970. Two were general,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-4 (1963); WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A
STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), but a third, PPI,
supra note 3, comprised an exhaustive examination of many aspects of the mutual fund
industry, including the function of management and its cost. The report of the study, which
made specific legislative proposals, was followed by meetings "to reach an agreement with
respect to controversial areas of legislation, including the fairness of management fees and
sales charges." Manges, The Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970-an Analysis
and Appraisal After Two Years, 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 387, 390 (1973). The impetus
for these studies arose from the observation that investment advisors may determine their
fees while subjected to a conflict of interest. For general commentary pertaining to manage-
ment fees, see Conference on Mutual Funds, The Mutual Fund Management Fee, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 726 (1967); Glick, Mutual Fund Management Fees: In Search of a Standard, 25 Bus.
LAW. 1471 (1970); Note, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees and the New Standard of Fiduciary
Duty-interpreting the 1970 Mutual Fund Act, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 627 (1971); Note, Mutual
Funds and Their Advisers: Strengthening Disclosure and Shareholder Control, 83 YALE L. J.
1475 (1974).[hereinafter cited as Strengthening Disclosure]; Note, The Mutual Fund and
Its Management Company: An Analysis of Business Incest, 71 YALE L. J. 137 (1961); Com-
ment, The Relationship Between the Investment Adviser and the Mutual Fund: Too Close
for Comfort, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 183 (1976). For commentary on the possibility of the recap-
ture of brokers' fees, see Miller & Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual
Funds, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 35 (1971); Comment, Mutual Funds and Independent Directors:
Can Moses Lead to Better Business Judgment?, 1972 DUKE L. J. 429. One commentator has
argued that fund advisors should not be forced to recapture; rather, brokers should be pre-
vented from executing orders for funds whose shares they sell. See Conflict of Interest, supra
note 46, at 392.
57. Concern over the manner in which advisory fees are calculated arose primarily because
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responsibility." Imposition of this fiduciary duty eliminated the
previous "gross-misconduct or abuse of trust" standard59 and re-
jected the stronger "reasonableness" test favored by the SEC.60 Al-
though this provision allowed courts more flexibility in evaluating
the propriety of advisory fees,61 it failed to specify the factors to be
considered in determining whether an advisor violated its fiduciary
duty. According to one commentator, however, the legislative his-
tory of this provision indicates that in making this determination,
a court should consider "the nature . . . and extent of the services
rendered to the fund; the extent to which economies of scale and
common management were shared with the fund;. . . other income
received by the adviser from the fund [including] brokerage com-
missions, payments for research services, subsidiaries, underwriting
fees; . . . [and] the extent of fund recapture of brokerage commis-
sions."'6 2 Therefore, at least implicitly, the amendments arguably
were intended to impose a fiduciary duty on advisors to recapture
underwriting fees as well as brokerage commissions.
Prior to the abolition of fixed brokerage commissions in 1975,11
the size of a fee is dependent upon the size of a particular fund's assets. As a fund's assets
increase, its fees experience a commensurate percentage growth. PPI, supra note 3, at 89.
Often the advisor's fees are set at one-half percent of the fund's total assets. This compensa-
tion arrangement provides the manager with a bonus whenever the "fund's value increase[s]
with a general market rise although such increases in portfolio value might have no relation-
ship to the advising capabilities of the fund's advisory company," but levies no penalty for
an advisor's substandard performance. Strengthening Disclosure, supra note 56, at 1477.
Such an arrangement could promote excessive risk-taking by fund advisors.
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970), which provides in pertinent part: "For the purposes
of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be
deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or
of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company. . . to such
investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser."
59. In situations involving shareholder contract ratification, the standards of gross-
misconduct or abuse of trust imposed on "a plaintiff shareholder. . . the heavy burden of
proving waste of corporate assets." Manges, supra note 56, at 393.
60. Id. The SEC's proposed reasonableness standard was introduced in a 1966 report, PPI,
supra note 3, at 143-47. The SEC's recommendations were before Congress in 1967 and 1968
but were not included in the final legislation. See Manges, supra note 56, at 389 & nn.10-11.
61. Manges, supra note 56, at 396. The amendments also gave courts the broad discretion
to grant necessary and appropriate relief. Id.
62. Id. Although Manges concludes that these factors are suggested by the ICAA's legisla-
tive history, the history itself does not mention explicitly a duty of recapture. See Hearings
on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754, and H.R. 14737 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 188
(1969); H.R. RPs. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970); S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1969).
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1) (Supp. 1977), which provides in pertinent part: "[O]n and
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similar concerns were expressed about a fund advisor's duty to re-
capture brokerage commissions paid by the fund to the advisor's
affiliates. In a study entitled Public Policy Implications of Invest-
ment Company Growth (PPI), the SEC recommended that advisors
be required to recapture such brokerage commissions." Because
fixed commissions were not tied to the actual services rendered,
they failed to reflect the savings usually inherent in bulk transac-
tions.
Devices such as give-ups, reciprocals, and reciprocity85 enabled
fund advisors to reduce the brokerage commissions indirectly.
Through selective usage of these devices, however, these reductions
benefited only the advisor, not the fund's shareholders.6 For exam-
ple, commissions drawn from the fund's assets were used to finance
the broker's research services.67 Research costs, arguably, are costs
of management to be paid for from the advisor's fee rather than from
the fund's assets. 8 These devices also were used to reward brokers
after June 4, 1975, no national securities exchange may impose any schedule or fix rates of
commissions, allowances, discounts, or other fees to be charged by its members .... "Until
1975, most rates were non-negotiable under the N. Y.S.E. Constitution Art. XV, § § 2, 7,
[19701 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 1702, 1707 (rescinded effective April 30, 1976).
64. PPI, supra note 3, at 171-73.
65. "Reciprocity," which has been described as the "simplest way to use brokerage com-
missions to pay brokers," involved the placement of orders by a fund with a broker who
received commissions equal to the cost of his services rendered. PPI, supra note 3, at 167. A
"reciprocal" took place when an advisor made a transaction on the New York Stock Exchange
but desired to pay part of the brokerage fees to a broker who lacked membership in the
Exchange. The fund would place an order with an Exchange broker who, in turn, would be
requested to place sufficient business with the non-Exchange broker to compensate the latter
for any services he might have performed. Miller & Carlson, supra note 56, at 36 n.6. "Give-
ups" occurred whenever funds ordered brokers to surrender portions of their commissions
to other brokers. PPI, supra note 3, at 169.
66. SEC SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcURrrIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963); Note, The Use of Brokerage Commissions To Promote Mutual Fund Sales: Time to
Give-up the "Give-Up" 68 COLUM. L. Rxv. 334 (1968).
Merely because the funds paid commissions that were insensitive to economies of scale and
therefore higher than the costs of the sellers' services did not mean that fund advisors bene-
fited. Nevertheless, they may have profited if the excessive part of the commission was used
to pay for such services as research, which normally is a cost of the advisor and thus computed
in his fee. A reduction in advisory fees through recapture would aid a fund in recovering part
of the excessive charges it has paid. Moreover, recapture would cause no losses to an advisor
who merely would subtract his affiliate's excessive profits from the fees paid by the fund. This
process will affect adversely the advisor's profits only if his fee includes amounts retained
because fund commissions rather than advisor fees have been used to pay for research.
67. Conflict of Interest, supra note 46, at 377.
68. The allocation of fees to pay for research may be more acceptable than the distribution
of fees to encourage fund sales. The encouragement of fund sales with fee allocations creates
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who were diligent in selling the fund's own shares to the public. 9
Since the advisor's fee usually was fixed as some percentage of the
value of the fund's assets,70 the advisor naturally would gain from
any increase in the value of the assets, whether the gain was attrib-
utable to the appreciation of gains on the fund's investment portfo-
lio or merely to the accumulation of additional capital from the sale
of the fund's own shares.7' Consequently, the decision to direct the
fund's brokerage business to one broker rather than to another was
often based on the broker's performance in placing the fund's shares
rather than his competence in handling the fund's portfolio transac-
tions.72 Moreover, these arrangements raised serious questions of
possible antitrust violations.73
Attempting to implement its policies both of promoting commis-
sion recapture and of proscribing practices that misled shareholders
as to the actual costs of managing funds, the SEC solicited com-
ments on proposed rule 10b-1071 under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. Under the rule, "if . . . a mutual fund manager [had]
various means at his disposal to recapture for the benefit of the fund
a portion of the commissions paid by the fund, he [was] under a
fiduciary duty to do sO. ''71 A manager who made no attempt to
recapture excess commissions and apply them toward the advisory
fee also risked violation of section 17(e)(1) of the ICA.77 Presumably,
a conflict of interest because "managers always benefit from the sale of new fund shares." In
contrast, some advisors have contended that, because "investment research is a task inti-
mately connected with the selection of a fund's portfolio," it is an expense that the fund
should pay. Conflict of Interest, supra note 46, at 377.
69. Conflict of Interest, supra note 46, at 372.
70. See note 57 supra.
71. Conflict of Interest, supra note 46, at 375-79.
72. Id.
73. See generally Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public,
22 STAN. L. REV. 675, 683 (1970). For a general discussion of antitrust developments in the
securities industry during the 1970's, see Pozen, Competition and Regulation in the Stock
Markets, 73 MICH. L. REv. 317 (1974); Note, Federal Legislation to Enhance Competition in
the Securities Industry, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621 (1975).
74. Id.
75. Proposed rule 10b-10, discussed in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26,
1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,523, would have made it
unlawful for any investment company manager to direct a broker who executed transactions
for the investment company to give up a portion of his compensation to other brokers, unless
the amounts given up were returned or otherwise credited to the investment company share-
holders.
76. Id. at 83,085.
77. Id. at 83,085-86.15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (1970) provides that affiliates of funds, includ-
ing advisors, must refuse "any compensation. . . for the purchase or sale of any property to
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by requiring all funds to recapture excess brokerage commissions,
the proposal would prevent some funds from gaining a competitive
advantage over others.
The proposed rule became partially obsolete, however, after the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) sanctioned volume discounts"
and abolished customer-directed give-ups. 79 Although proposed rule
10b-10 was withdrawn," the SEC still favored recapture when the
NYSE volume discount rules were not controlling." Consequently,
after years of criticism and study, Congress included a provision in
the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 that required the termina-
tion of all fixed commissions on exchanges by May 1, 1975.2
The Duty to Recapture and the Courts
Despite shareholder demands, though, fund advisors failed to re-
capture brokerage commissions. Disgruntled shareholders then
sought a remedy in the courts, alleging that this failure to recapture
was a breach of the advisor's fiduciary duty. 3 An early suit, Kurach
or for such registered company . . . except in the course of such person's business as an
underwriter or broker."
78. Volume discounts first became available in 1968 on orders exceeding 1,000 shares; later,
when negotiated commissions were allowed, the discounts were permitted on transactions
above $500,000 (later $300,000). For a discussion of these developments, see Papilsky v.
Berndt, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,627, at 90,122 (1976).
79. For a review of the SEC's efforts and the NYSE's responses concerning fixed commis-
sion rates, see Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 668-82 (1975); Fogel v.
Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 734-37, 739-44 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
80. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8746 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 77,761 (Nov. 10, 1969).
81. Id.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1) (Supp. 1977). For the pertinent text of § 78f(e)(1), see note 63
supra. An outgoing NYSE Chairman remarked that the termination of fixed brokerage com-
mission rates produced difficulties for the brokerage business. In a newspaper article contain-
ing the Chairman's remarks, figures indicated that institutions had saved 39% on brokerage
commissions, but individual investors had saved only five percent. Small investors had saved
nothing and, in some instances, had been forced to pay higher brokerage commission rates.
Brokers suffered a revenue loss of 6.3%, and a number of brokerage firms were forced to merge.
Mullaney, Kolton's Second Thoughts on Negotiated Commissions, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1977,
at 37, col. 2.
83. In Fogel v. Chestnutt, 53 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976),
the court noted that "a large number of derivative stockholders actions [were] brought on
behalf of mutual funds against investment advisors, distributors, and directors of both, pri-
marily in consequence of [the remarks in the PPI study on recapture]." Id. at 734. See also
Butowsky, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Revisited, Moses v. Burgin and Rosenfeld v.
Black, 17 N.Y.L.F. 735 (1971), in which the author estimated that over 50 such suits were
filed. Id. at 736.
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v. Weissman,4 involved a proposed settlement agreement, charac-
terized by the SEC as "illusory"," pursuant to which the defendant,
Dreyfus Fund, Inc., would begin recapturing brokerage commissions
and would be committed to amassing an amount equal to at least
one million dollars over the succeeding five years. No provision was
made for compensating the plaintiffs retroactively for the defen-
dant's prior failure to recapture. The district court denied the plain-
tiffs' cause of action, reasoning that, because section 17(e) of the
ICA allows affiliates of the fund's advisor to receive commissions
from fund transactions,"6 they also could prevent their recapture. 7
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Moses v. Burgin,5
described as the "first thorough examination of recapture and its
associated issues,"" held that the fiduciary duty of fund managers
imposed by section'36 of the ICA included the obligation to disclose
to independent directors the possibility of a conflict of interest in
the managers' failure to recapture available funds.8" Rejecting prior
cases denying recovery, the court concluded that the use of broker-
age commissions to finance the sale of the fund's own shares bene-
fited only the fund advisor while impairing the capital contributed
by shareholders. The court stated: "The existing shareholders have
contributed-by paying more than otherwise necessary on fund's
portfolio transactions-to the cost of the sale, which was supposed
to have been borne by the new member alone."'" Simultaneously,
84. 49 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
85. Id. at 307.
86. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (1970).
87. Pertinent to the court's decision was its conclusion that the plaintiff's chance of success
was minimal if the case was to be tried because no recovery had yet been granted in an
excessive management fee case. 49 F.R.D. at 306-07.
88. 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
89. Comment, Settlement Standards for Mutual Fund Shareholder Litigation Involving
the Fiduciary Obligation to Recapture, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1039, 1046 (1972).
90. Id. at 384. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970) (amended 1975). One method by which
Congress sought to curb abuses of the ICA by mutual fund advisors was to require that no
more than 60% of a fund's directors be interested persons. Id. at § 80a-10(a) (1970). One
commentator identified both Congress' intent and the chief criticism of the system: "The
principal safeguard . . . against overreaching . . . is . . . the unaffiliated director ....
[But] [tihe men who need to be watched pick the watchdogs to watch them." Comment,
The Mutual Fund Management Fee, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 726, 739 (1967). For analysis of the
responsibilities of these independent directors, see Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties
and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1058 (1967); Comment,
Mutual Funds and Independent Directors, 1972 DUKE L. J. 429; Comment, Duties of the
Independent Director in Open-End Mutual Funds, 70 MICH. L. REv. 696 (1972).
91. 445 F.2d at 374.
1
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with these excessive contributions, the court observed, the fund's
net assets were increased, thereby augmenting the fund manager's
fee.
After reviewing the increasing SEC and congressional involve-
ment in the recapture issue, Judge Aldrich, writing for the court,
determined that the fund managers knew of feasible legal methods
of recapture but failed to inform the independent directors of the
potential application of these practices." Although the SEC pro-
posed rule 10b-10 after commencement of the suit, the fund direc-
tors, led by the interested members, failed to approve the recapture
of give-ups until a week before their use was abolished.13 Responding
to testimony that proposed rule 10b-10 was a "bombshell" to man-
agement, the court stated: "After the . . . SEC proceedings . . .
and the 1966 PPI report, the bomb's fuse had been audible to man-
agement for a long time.""
Addressing the recapture issue after the abolition of fixed broker-
age commissions, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Fogel v. Chestnutt,5 rejected the defendant's contention that be-
cause recapture was neither feasible nor legal, they were under no
duty to inform the fund's independent directors of the potential for
recapture. In its repudiation of the illegality argument, which was
founded on the amicus' interpretation of the exchanges' anti-rebate
rules, the court stated that "recapture by a fund was a method, then
the only available method, for avoiding the payment of advisory and
selling costs exceeding those stipulated in its management con-
tracts."9 Rather than providing a rebate to customers, recapture
served only to prevent the commissions paid by the fund on portfolio
business from being used to remunerate fund managers indirectly.
92. Id. at 378-79.
93. Although Rule 10b-10 was proposed on January 26, 1968, see note 75 supra, until
December 5, 1968, give-ups still were permissable under the rules of the Philadelphia-
Baltimore-Washington and Pacific exchanges. 445 F.2d at 380-81.
94. Id. at 381.
95. 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976).
96. Id. at 750-55.
97. Id. at 754. The court observed that "none of the arrangements would have resulted in
the Fund's paying less than the stipulated commission rates," id. at 753, and that
[tihe situation was not one in which recapture would result in an adviser's
obtaining services at less than cost whereas other paid the full cost; such unfair-
ness as there was in recapture lay in the fact that advisers to mutual funds were




Moreover, management directed give-ups to brokers who either pro-
vided research or sold the fund's shares did not violate these anti-
rebate rules, although such payments necessitated the relinquish-
ment of some unearned portions of the brokerage commissions. The
court concluded that neither the SEC's policy opposing institutional
exchange memberships nor the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975's prohibiting such memberships proved that recapture was
illegal:98
Congress simply decided that in the brave new world of negoti-
ated rates, brokers serving the public should have the benefit of
institutional business and that there was no need for institutional
membership when the negotiated rate system would allow an
institution to have its orders executed at charges that bore a
reasonable relation to the services actually rendered."
In Tannenbaum v. Zeller,"' the most recent case to consider the
brokerage fee recapture issue, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held the defendant-advisor liable for failing to disclose the
possibility of recapturing brokerage commissions in proxy state-
ments to the shareholders of Chemical Fund, Inc.' °1 The court, how-
ever, rejected several theories of liability advanced by the plaintiff.
First, the plaintiff argued that the fund advisor's failure to recap-
ture violated the management and distribution contracts between
the fund and the advisor. In rejecting this contention, the Second
Circuit noted that the agreements made no reference to the alloca-
tion of excess brokerage commissions.' 2 The court thereby accepted
the defendant's uncontradicted testimony that the use of excess
commissions to pay for services was "implicit in the negotiation of
the management fee."'" 3
The plaintiff next argued that the fund's certificate of incorpora-
98. Id. at 755. In 1972, the SEC promulgated rule 19b-2 prohibiting those institutions not
transacting at least 80% of their business in public securities from acquiring membership on
exchanges. 38 Fed. Reg. 3928 (1973) (formerly codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2). This rule
was designed to prevent the inequity of permitting membership only for the purpose of
recovering excess commissions. The Securities Amendments Act of 1975 adopted a slightly
different position, preventing exchange members from effecting transactions for their own
account. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78k(a) (Supp. 1977).
99. 533 F.2d at 755.
100. 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1977).
101. Id. at 429-34.
102. Id. at 414.
103. Id. at 415.
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tion, requiring it to receive "not less than 'net asset value' for each
share sold," was violated when the advisors used brokerage commis-
sions to reimburse dealers for sales and research.0 4 The First Circuit
had accepted this rationale in Moses v. Burgin, holding that the use
of excessive brokerage fees to promote fund sales essentially enabled
new purchasers to buy at a discount below true asset value.0 5 In
Tannenbaum, however, the court agreed with the reasoning in
Fogel,'" decided two years earlier by a different panel of the court,
that this argument overstated the effect of the fund's failure to
recapture., 07
The court also disagreed with the plaintiffs argument that the
advisor's failure to recapture constituted a breach of a fiduciary
duty. The ICA imposed no absolute duty to recapture excess broker-
age fees.' 8 Moreover, because a sufficient disclosure to the fund's
independent directors had been made, the decision to forego recap-
ture was merely a justifiable exercise of informed discretion.' 9 The
court concluded, however, that, because the proxies failed to reveal
that brokerage commissions were used to finance the sale of fund
shares and research and neglected to mention the feasibility of re-
capture, the means available for recapture, or the directors' reasons
for failing to recapture,"'0 the proxies were false and misleading."'
In Papilsky v. Berndt,' 2 the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York examined whether mutual fund managers have a
fiduciary duty to disclose to the fund's independent directors the
possibility of recapturing underwriting fees. The court found that
the fund advisor, Lord, Abbett and Co., failed to fully inform the
board of directors of the feasibility of underwriting commission re-
104. Id. at 416.
105: 445 F.2d at 374.
106. 533 F.2d at 744.
107. 552 F.2d at 416.
108. Id. at 417.
109. Id. at 413-28. The court established a three-part test to determine whether a fund's
directors or advisors violated their fiduciary obligation under § 36 of the ICA, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 80a-35 (1971 & Supp. 1977). The evidence must establish that the independent directors:
(1) were not dominated or unduly influenced by the investment advisor; (2) were
fully informed by the advisor and interested directors of the possibility of recap-
ture and the alternative uses of brokerage; and (3) fully aware of this informa-
tion, reached a reasonable business decision to forego recapture after a thorough
review of all relevant factors.
552 F.2d at 418 (footnote omitted).
110. Id. at 433.
111. Id. at 434.
112. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,627, at 90,121 (1976).
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capture. '3 The possibility of recapture, together with the fund attor-
ney's advice that such action could create "serious legal risks", had
been mentioned at only one directors' meeting. According to the
defendants, the recapture of underwriting commissions arguably
violated the rules and policies of the National Association of Secu-
rity Dealers (NASD), of section 17(a) of the ICA, and of the invest-
ment restrictions in the fund's charter. The court noted, however,
that neither the SEC nor the NASD had construed the law and rules
in the manner suggested by the defendants." 5 Because the potential
for conflicting interests was sufficiently great, the independent
directors not only should have been informed fully of the possibility
of recapture but, if necessary, have been given access to disinter-
ested counsel to assist in analyzing the legal risks created by recap-
ture."6 Rather than complying with its duty to disclose, however,
Lord, Abbett and Co. informed the independent directors that re-
capture was illegal."17 The court concluded, consistent with preced-
ent in the First and Second Circuits, that the fund managers' failure
to consider objectively the possibility of underwriting fee recapture
constituted a breach of its fiduciary duty.
This conclusion is undermined by three factors. First, in contrast
to Papilsky, the district court in Moses v. Burgin held that recap-
ture would violate the NASD Rules of Fair Practice."8 Although the
First Circuit reversed the district court's decision, because the
plaintiffs failed to challenge on appeal the lower court's conclusion
that the recapture of underwriting fees is prohibited, that portion
of the district court's decision remains viable. Thus a conflict among
the circuits is created. Second, section 21(2) of the Security Acts
Amendments of 1975 authorizes the use of brokerage commissions
to pay for research, provided that such action does not deceive the
fund shareholders and that the payments represent reasonable com-
pensation for the services performed." 9 The provision's failure to
113. Id. at 90,132-35.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17a (1970).
115. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,627, at 90,130-32.
116. Id. at 90,133.
117. Id. at 90,134.
118. 316 F. Supp. 31, 47-48 (D. Mass. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
119. 15 U.S.C.A. 78bb(e)(1) (Supp. 1977). Section 78bb(e)(1) provides in pertinent part:
No person. . . shall be deemed to have acted unlawfully or to have breached a
fiduciary duty . . . solely by reason of his having caused [an] account to pay
a member of an exchange, broker, or dealer an amount of commission for effect-
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mention excessive underwriting commissions as a source from which
research expenses could be paid may indicate that Congress would
distinguish questions involving underwriting fees from those con-
cerning brokerage commissions.' 2 Thus, although Congress might
authorize the recapture of brokerage commissions, it might con-
demn a similar use of underwriting fees. Third, the court's conclu-
sion in Papilsky was conditioned upon the absence of legal impedi-
ments imposed by the NASD and SEC underwriting rules. As dis-
cussed in the next section, however, the NASD has interpreted its
rules as preventing recapture, thus weakening the viability of
Papilsky.
Legal Impediments to the Recapture of Underwriting Commissions
Several objections to recapture by muni-funds arise from the laws
and rules governing underwriting and from the laws and rules con-
trolling muni-fund portfolio purchase procedures. Though the lat-
ter, more direct type of legal restrictions may be avoided by obtain-
ing an exemption from the SEC, others may not be avoided so
readily.
The primary legislation affecting underwriting procedures is the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act Amend-
ments of 1975 (SAA) .121 Pursuant to these enactments, two self-
regulatory bodies have been established; the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD), regulating the private equity security
market, and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB),
performing similar duties in the municipal securities market. 22
ing a securities transaction in excess of the amount of commission another
member ... would have charged ... if such person determined in good faith
that such amount of commission was reasonable in relation to the value of the
brokerage and research services provided by such member, broker, or dealer,
viewed in terms of either that particular transaction or his overall responsibili-
ties with respect to the accounts as to which he exercises investment discretion.
120. One commentator has suggested that § 21(2) may be interpreted as providing an
implied congressional authorization for using both underwriting fees and brokerage commis-
sions to pay for research. Note, The Relationship between the Investment Adviser and the
Mutual Fund: Too Close for Comfort, 45 FORDHAM L. Rv. 183, 200 (1976).
121. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970).
The SAA, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975), amends many parts of the securities code
and is codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1977).
122. The NASD was authorized and registered pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3 (1971 &
Supp. 1977). The MSRB was established pursuant to id. § 78o-4 (Supp. 1977). Until the SAA
were enacted in 1975, municipal bond dealers were virtually unregulated. Section 3(2) of the
SAA, however, amended the definition of "person" contained in the Securities Exchange Act
[Vol. 19:519
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The NASD, as the self-regulatory body for the private securities
market, does not govern the practices of those persons working in
the municipal bond field. Nevertheless, its positions and rules are
important indicators of attitudes toward recapture in the related
municipal securities market because the MSRB and the NASD are
subject to the same legislative mandate, preventing "unfair dis-
crimination between customers."'1' This statutory language has
prompted NASD's condemnation of recapture.'2 4 The MSRB, how-
ever, has not adopted a similar rule or interpretation preventing
recapture by muni-funds; instead, its rule could be interpreted to
sanction a muni-fund's recapture of underwriting fees from their
affiliates.' 25 This interpretation would resolve anticipated problems
of 1934 to include state and local governments, id. § 78c(a)(9), thus subjecting professionals
dealing in municipal securities to the terms of the 1934 Act. Despite this explicit redefinition,
the SEC contends that the anti-fraud provisions of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), had always applied to persons involved in trading municipal
securities. See S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 179, 224.
Governments issuing bonds always have been exempted from the provisions of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970). See Securities Act of 1933, § 3, 15 U.S.C. §
77c(a)(2) (1970), which provides in pertinent part: "[T]he provisions of his subchapter shall
not apply to any. . . security issued or guaranteed. . . by any State of the United States,
or by any political subdivision of a state or territory, or by any public instrumentality of one
or more States or territories .... "The rationale for this exemption is unclear. See Doty &
Petersen, The Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in Municipal Securities, 71 Nw. U.L.
REv. 283, 286 n.10 (1976). A lawyer who assisted in drafting the Act subsequently wrote that
"[m]unicipal bonds, which we sought to include in our original draft, were made exempt
for obvious political reasons." Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Acts of 1933,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 39, (1959).
The tremendous expansion of individual investment in the municipal securities market and
the concomitant increase in fraudulant trading practices induced Congress to promulgate a
comprehensive regulatory scheme with its enactment of the SAA. Nevertheless, the new
amendments still prevent the SEC and the MRSB from requiring either directly or indirectly
through a dealer or broker that an issuer of municipal securities submit resale information
to the SEC, the MSRB, or to any prospective purchaser. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(d)(1)-(2) (Supp.
1977). Rather, the MSRB may require brokers and dealers to furnish it or prospective pur-
chasers with information concerning the issuer that generally is available from a source other
than the issuer. Id. § 78o-4(d)(2). For an analysis of the SAA, see Doty & Petersen, supra, at
298-302, 343-48; Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities, 60 MINN. L. REV. 567
(1976).
123. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o-3(b)(6), 78o-4(b)(c) (Supp. 1977).
124. See e.g., Letter of Frank J. Wilson (Dec. 6, 1976), distributed in Investment Company
Institute Members Notice 70-76 (Dec. 17, 1976); NASD, Notice to Members 77-31 (Sept. 23,
1977). For a discussion of matters generally related to the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, see
the interpretations in the Rules, NASD MAN. (CCH).
125. Rule G-11(b), Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Release No. 15090 (Aug. 25, 1978), provides in pertinent part:
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in the underwriting procedure through disclosure-requiring a mu-
nicipal securities dealer, when submitting his order to an underwrit-
ing syndicate, to divulge whether he is buying on behalf of an affili-
ated portfolio.' 6 Disclosure alone, of course, does not bar recapture
from an affiliate.
The principal argument against permitting the recapture of un-
derwriting fees in the private securities market is that such a prac-
tice would violate NASD Rule of Fair Practice 24,'1 which allows
discounts, selling concessions, and other allowances only as consid-
eration for services rendered in distribution and only to brokers or
dealers engaged in the investment banking or securities business.
This rule assures all buyers the opportunity to purchase securities
on the same terms. The contention that Rule 24 prohibits under-
writing fee recapture is based on the theory that recapture would
permit mutual funds to obtain a discount unavailable to other pur-
chasers of the new securities.' 8 Conversely, it may be argued that
recaptured fees are not returned to the investors but are used to
offset the advisor's excessive management fee, and therefore, Rule
(b) Disclosure of Capacity. Every municipal securities dealer that submits
an order to a syndicate or to a member of a syndicate for the purchase of
municipal securities held by the syndicate shall disclose at the time of submis-
sion of such order if the securities are being purchased for its dealer account,
for the account of a related portfolio of such municipal securities dealer, for a
municipal securities investment trust sponsored by such municipal securities
dealer, or for an accumulation account established in connection with such a
municipal securities investment trust. The senior syndicate manager shall
promptly disclose to the other members of the syndicate, upon request made
prior to final settlement of the syndicate account, each order submitted for such
a related portfolio, municipal securities investment trust, or accumulation ac-
count, indicating the identity of the. . . related portfolio, . . municipal secur-
ities investment trust, or . . .accumulation account, . . . the aggregate face
amount of each maturity and the maturity dates of the securities which are the
subject of the order.
126. Id.
127. Rule 24 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD MAN. (CCH) 1 2174, at 2098,
provides:
Selling concessions, discounts, or other allowances, as such, shall be allowed
only as consideration for services rendered in distribution and in no event shall
be allowed to anyone other than a broker or dealer actually engaged in the
investment banking or securities business; provided, however, that nothing in
this rule shall prevent any member from selling any security owned by him to
any person at any net price which may be be fixed by him unless prevented
therefrom by agreement.
128. For a comprehensive analysis concluding that recapture constitutes price discrimina-
tion, see NASD, Notice to Members 77-31 (Sept. 23, 1977).
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24 does not prohibit recapture.' 9 The issue, then, is whether a fund
obtains a discount when its advisor's fee is reduced in proportion to
commissions or concessions received by the advisor or an affiliate.
As previously discussed, the New York district court in Papilsky
summarily rejected the argument that underwriting commission
recapture by an equity fund violated Rule 24.130 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on Fogel, in which the Second Circuit,
in a similarly cursory manner, declined to hold that a tender offer
fee recapture violated Rule 24.' ' But responding to Papilsky, the
NASD stated that underwriting fee recapture was precluded by
Rule 24, thereby significantly undermining that case's viability.
The NASD's strong opposition to underwriting fee recapture re-
flects its Board of Governors' decision that the practice would create
a special class of investors, the mutual funds, who could purchase
securities at a price more favorable than that available to the pub-
lic.'32 A reduction of the fund advisory fee through recapture, the
Board determined, was indistinguishable from a direct discount
accomplished by lowering the security's purchase price.1rs Because
a fund was not "a broker or dealer actually engaged in the invest-
ment banking or securities business" within the meaning of the
NASD bylaws, it could not qualify for a selling discount under Rule
24. ,3 Finally, the Board determined that recapture would constitute
preferential treatment, subject to disclosure under NASD Rule of
Fair Practice 7.35
The SEC has indicated, though, that, prior to their implementa-
129. The court in Fogel discussed this argument in the context of brokerage commissions.
533 F.2d at 753-54; see note 97 supra & accompanying text.
130. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,627, at 90,131. For a
discussion of Papilsky, see text accompanying notes 112-17 supra.
131. 553 F.2d at 752 n.25. For a discussion of Fogel, see notes 95-99 supra & accompanying
text.
132. The NASD initially announced its position in letters responding to requests for inter-
pretation of Rule 24 from the counsel of fund organizations. Letter of Frank J. Wilson (Dec.
6, 1976), distributed in Investment Company Institute Members Notice 70-76 (Dec. 17, 1976).
See also NASD, Notice to Members 77-31 (Sept. 23, 1977).
133. Letter of Frank J. Wilson (Dec. 6, 1976), distributed in Investment Company Institute
Members Notice 70-76 (Dec. 17, 1976), at 2-3.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. Rule 7 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD MAN. (CCH) 2157, at 2075,
provides: "Selling syndicate agreements or selling group agreements shall set forth the price
at which the securities are to be sold to the public or the formula by which such price can be
ascertained, and shall state clearly to whom and under what circumstances concessions, if
any, may be allowed."
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tion, NASD's rules must be approved by the SEC. 3 ' As SEC Secre-
tary George Fitzsimmons has stated, the policy of the NASD places
"[i]nvestment companies and their advisers . . . in a dilemma:
there will be liability under the Papilsky doctrine or penalties under
the NASD Rules of Fair Practice."'' 7
A second argument against the legality of underwriting fee recap-
ture is that it violates Rule 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice,
which states that "[a] member . . . shall observe high standards
of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade."'3
Invoking this rule, the NASD Board of Governors has disallowed the
sale of securities in a "hot issue" offering to the vendor's employees,
officers, and other associates. 39 Considered manipulative by the
NASD, this practice was barred in a 1970 construction of Rule 1.11 o
In Papilsky4 the defendants argued that the NASD's interpreta-
tion of Rule 1 required all securities in a public offering to be sold
at one price, free from any premiums or discounts. Because recap-
ture effectively created a discount, the defendants contended, it was
proscribed by Rule 1.1 The court regarded the NASD interpreta-
tion merely as a response to the "hot issue" problem and concluded
136. The SEC requested that the "interpretation ... be filed, as soon as practicable and
in any event not later than April 4, 1977, as a proposed rule change for thorough consideration
in accordance with the procedures specified in Section 19(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934." Letter from SEC Secretary George Fitzsimmons to NASD President Gordon S.
Macklin (Feb. 17, 1977), at 3. The NASD's proposed changes in Rule 24, outlined in NASD,
Notice to Members 77-31 (Sept. 23, 1977), are not a response to the SEC request for a formal
rule change. Rather, the Notice reiterates the NASD's position on recapture and outlines
proposals to terminate abuses in the use of underwriting allowances, selling concessions, and
discounts.
137. Letter from SEC Secretary George Fitzsimmons to NASD President Gordon S. Mack-
lin (Feb. 17, 1977), at 3. Moreover, the possibility of a direct conflict between the SEC and
the NASD on the correct interpretation of Rule 24 is suggested by Fitzsimmon's statement
that "Ipirior Commission decisions cast doubt on the NASD's authority to adopt a rule
having the effect which the NASD's interpretation would give to Section 24." Id. at 2 (foot-
note omitted).
138. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD MAN. (CCH) 2151, at 2039.
139. The practice of selling securities to the underwriter's associates in an attempt to take
advantage of the "hot issues" or securities in short supply became a serious problem in the
late 1960's. An employee, officer, or associate of the selling underwriter or broker would hold
the securities for later resale in the secondary market. As a result, a substantial profit often
would redound to the selling underwriter or broker. W. PRIFrl, SECURITIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
OFFERINGS 201 (1974).
140. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, (Interpretation of the Board of Governors), NASD MAN.
(CCH) 2151, at 2039.
141. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,627, at 90,131.
142. Id.
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that the defendants' proposed construction was unnecessarily
broad.13 Recapturing underwriting commissions, the court main-
tained, did not permit the fund to hold securities for subsequent sale
to benefit the syndicate or selling group. Rather, "[an advisor] like
any other NASD member designated by it, would be a member of
the selling group for the sole purpose of receiving underwriting com-
missions; it would not be making a public distribution any more
than any other NASD member so designated would be." '
Another argument against the legality of recapture, unrelated to
either the NASD or the MSRB rules, is that recapture is inconsist-
ent with mutual fund charters. Delimiting a fund's operations to the
statutorily authorized activities of investment companies, these
charters prohibit the funds from serving as underwriters. ' Argua-
bly, a violation of the charter results whenever a fund's advisor
becomes a member of a selling group or syndicate because both the
advisor and the fund act as underwriters. In Papilsky the court
rejected this argument,' reasoning that "[tlhere is no reason to
think, apart from a too heavy reliance on form over substance, that
the designation of Lord, Abbett [the advisor] rather than another
broker-dealer to receive the commissions would have turned Affili-
ated Fund into an underwriter."'47 Importantly, because the fund in
Papilsky did not receive a commission but merely obtained a reduc-
tion in its advisory fee obligation, it could not have been regarded
as an underwriter.
Similarly, the laws governing the purchase of new issues by mu-
tual funds raise additional legal impediments to recapture. Sections
17(a)"' and 10(f)'4 of the ICA proscribe transactions between funds
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Papilsky v. Berndt, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,627, at 90,131 (1976); PPI, supra note 3, at 45.
146. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SE c. L. REP. (CCH) 95,627, at 90,131.
147. Id. at 90,132.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1970). Section 17(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person or promoter of or principal under-
writer for a registered investment company (other than a company of the charac-
ter described in section 12(d) (3) (A) and (B)), or any affiliated person of such
a person, promoter, or principal underwriter, acting as principal-
(1) knowingly to sell any security or other property to such registered
company, unless such sale involves solely (A) securities of which the
buyer is the issuer, (B) securities of which the seller is the issuer and
which are part of a general offering to the holders of a class of its securities
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and their advisors, the advisor's affiliates, or syndicates in which the
advisors and affiliates participate as underwriters. Although funds
observing certain safeguards, such as purchasing in limited quanti-
ties only SEC registered securities,50 are exempted from these pros-
criptions, these exceptions apply only to investment companies
purchasing corporate securities, not to muni-funds.
The restrictions imposed by the ICA on the purchase of bonds by
muni-funds not only prevent recapture but also limit severely a
fund's investment options. Although the restrictions imposed by the
ICA prevent an equity or corporate bond fund from purchasing a
security from a syndicate, the fund may purchase the security on
the secondary market. In contrast, the manager of a muni-fund
often lacks this alternative because many small, high-yield munici-
pal bonds are not sold on the secondary market.15" ' Moreover, since
advisors frequently are affiliated with firms underwriting numerous
municipal bond offerings, a general restriction preventing a fund
from purchasing new issues from its advisor's affiliate's syndicate
excludes certain funds from a substantial segment of the bond mar-
ket. 12
or (C) securities deposited with the trustee of a unit investment trust or
periodic payment plan by the depositor thereof ....
Subsections (d) and (e) of § 17 might also affect proposed recapture transactions. See id.
§ 80a-17(d) to (e). Section 17(d) requires that a fund's participation in a joint enterprise
with an affiliate be conducted in a manner that places the fund in at least the same position
as the other participants, and § 17(e) bars a fund affiliate acting as a broker from receiving
compensation from a fund in excess of specified amounts.
149. Id. § 80(a)-10(f). Section 10(f) provides in pertinent part: "No registered investment
company shall knowingly purchase or otherwise acquire, during the existence of any under-
writing or selling syndicate, any security. . . a principal underwriter of which is an officer,
director . . . adviser, or . . . affiliated person." The SEC may exempt any transaction or
class of transactions from these restrictions "if such exemption is consistent with the protec-
tion of investors." Id.
150. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.10f-3 (1977), which provides in pertinent part:
Any purchase of securities by a registered investment company prohibited by
section 10(f) of the act shall be exempt [provided]
(a) The securities . . . are . . . registered. ...
(b) The . . . spread . . . shall not exceed: . . . (3) 1.50 percent of the
. . price. . . of any other security to be purchased.
(c) The issuer. . . shall have been in continuous operation for not less
than three years. . ..
(d) The amount of securities of any class of such registered issue. ..
shall not exceed 3 percent of the amount of the offering of such class.
151. See R. ROBINSON, POSTWAR MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECUITIES 11-
12 (1960). See also SECURIIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS (G.
Calbert ed. 1972); Doty & Petersen, supra note 122, at 317-19.
152. For example, these restrictions prevent the Merrill, Lynch Municipal Bond Fund from
MUNI-FUNDS
The problem of the investment options limitation has been
brought to the SEC's attention by several funds petitioning for ex-
emptions from sections 10(f) and 17 of the ICA."13 In granting ex-
emptions to section 10(f), the SEC has imposed several restrictions
on mutual funds for the protection of investors, differing in impor-
tant respects from those imposed on equity funds seeking similar
exemptions. First, analogous to the equity fund exemption require-
ment that securities bought from affiliates' syndicates be registered
with the SEC, municipal bonds purchased by muni-funds must be
appraised by a recognized bond rating service such as Standard &
Poor's or Moody's. 54 In addition, if the issue has received a rating
of at least "A", the fund may ignore the requirement that the issuer
be in existence for at least three years prior to the purchase of the
securities. 5 5 Strict adherence to this three-year requirement would
prevent muni-funds from buying from their affiliates' syndicates
bonds issued by public authorities organized to finance new facili-
ties. Finally, the quantity limitations pertaining to muni-funds were
increased, exceeding the three percent of a particular offering limi-
tation applicable to equity funds receiving exemptions.'55 Municipal
bond issues are often substantially smaller than corporate issues,
purchasing a "significant portion" of all underwritten issues. See Notice of Filing of Applica-
tion Pursuant to § 10(f) of the Act Exempting Certain Transactions from the-Provisions of §
10(f), In re Merrill, Lynch Municipal Bond Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Co. Act of 1940
Release No. 9779 (May 26, 1977), SEC Docket 706 (June 12, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Merrill, Lynch Notice].
153. See, e.g., Application for an Order Pursuant to § 6(c), § 10(f), & § 17(b) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, In re Pennsylvania Tax-Free Income Trust Release No.
9784 (May 31, 1977), SEC Docket 706 (June 12, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania
Trust Application]; Merrill, Lynch Notice, supra note 152.
154. In one instance the applicants requested a modification of rule 10f-3, 17 C.F.R. §
270.10f-3 (1977), see note 150 supra, to limit purchases to securities that had received an
"investment grade rating from a recognized bond rating service." Pennsylvania Trust Appli-
cation, supra note 153. To date, however, the SEC has limited its exemptions to the purchase
of bonds with at least an "A" rating. See, e.g., Order Pursuant to § 10(f), In re Merrill, Lynch
Municipal Bond Fund, Inc., Release No. 9870 (July 27, 1977), SEC Docket 1406 (August
9, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Merrill, Lynch Order]; Order Pursuant to § 10(f) of the Act
Exempting Certain Transactions from the Provisions of § 10(f), In re Pennsylvania Tax-Free
Income Trust, Release No. 9871 (July 28, 1977), SEC Docket 1407 (August 9, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Trust Order].
155. Merrill, Lynch Order, supra note 154. For a description of the requirements imposed
on equity funds seeking exemptions, see note 150 supra. Another resolution to this problem
may have been to require that issuers file with the SEC information similar to that necessary
for registration. Such a practice, however, would contravene the statutory policy against
issuer registration. See note 122 supra.
156. See note 150 supra.
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and a limitation of three percent could reduce a potential invest-
ment below the fund's purchase minimum. Therefore, the SEC now
allows municipal bond purchases of three percent of the issue or
$500,000, whichever is higher, but not to exceed ten percent of the
issue. 15
A counterpart to section 10(f) of the ICA is section 17(a), which
prevents the fund's principal underwriter or any affiliated person
from selling securities to the fund.158 As previously noted, the defen-
dants in Papilsky argued that by designating underwriting commis-
sions to an advisor, the advisor must be reclassified as a member of
the syndicate or selling group, thereby becoming a seller in violation
of section 17(a).151 Whether the defendant was considered as a desig-
natee of underwriting commissions for the benefit of the fund or as
a designator of commissions through its designee-agent, "the as-
serted legal danger [of being deemed a seller] was no more real." '
The court could ascertain "no sound reason of pertinent law or
policy to strain in this way to uphold defendant's diversion of com-
missions for their own benefit rather than the benefit of the share-
holders.""6 ' Nevertheless, the court noted that the defendants could
have sought a section 17(b) exemption because the transactions
were "reasonable and fair and [did] not involv[e] overreach-
ing.'"162
Inasmuch as the SEC has not yet issued exemptive orders under
section 17 for recapture transactions, the court's holding in Papilsky
remains the only definitive interpretation of section 17(a). Some
developments suggest, however, that the SEC ultimately will re-
quire funds to obtain section 17 exemptions. For example, the SEC
has restricted the exemptions granted to muni-funds under section
10(f) by requiring that they consider the feasibility of recapturing
the costs of portfolio transactions and seek section 17 exemptions.63
Such recapture might be undertaken whenever the interested direc-
tors determine that it is in the fund's best interests or if "otherwise
required by developments in the law." '164
157. Merrill, Lynch Order, supra note 154.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1970). For the text of § 17(a), see note 148 supra.
159. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,627, at 90,131. See text
accompanying notes 112-17 supra.
160. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 95,627, at 90,131.
161. Id.
162. Id. See ICA, § 17(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(b)(1) (1970).
163. See Merrill, Lynch Order, supra note 154; Pennsylvania Trust Order, supra note 154.
164. Merrill, Lynch Order, supra note 154; Pennsylvania Trust Order, supra note 154.
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MUNI-FUNDS
The standards for a section 17 exemption could be less detailed
than those existing under section 10(f), reflecting legal and policy
decisions as to whether transactions allowing recapture are fair to
fund investors. Thus, for muni-funds at least, although recapture
must be considered seriously because the advisor may have a fidu-
ciary duty to inform the independent directors of its feasibility, it
will not be permitted by the SEC until that agency finally acts on
the section 17 exemption applications. The ultimate solution to the
conflict over recapture, therefore, not only should entail a definitive
interpretation of section 17 but also should resolve the differing
viewpoints presented by the SEC, the NASD, and the district court
in Papilsky. As a result of the conflicting policies of the MSRB and
the NASD toward recapture, however, the subject may be resolved
differently by the two sectors of the financial industry regulated by
these bodies.
CONCLUSION
The legislation permitting the pass-through of tax-exempt munic-
ipal bond interest apparently was approved without sufficient study
to anticipate the current regulatory problems. Because muni-funds
potentially may invest billions of dollars in the municipal bond
market, the need for reexamination of the muni-fund concept is
urgent. In the past several years, Congress has sought new ways to
raise revenues, to encourage tax equity, and to reform existing tax
exemptions by imposing minimum taxes on previously untaxed in-
vestments. Rather than promoting any of these objectives, the suc-
cessful operation of muni-funds may create an insurmountable bar-
rier to the elimination of the municipal bond interest exemption.
The growing popularity of muni-funds also highlights the prob-
lems created by fixed underwriting commissions. Both the SEC and
the MSRB, as regulators of muni-funds, have an opportunity to
require funds to consider the recapture of excessive underwriting
commissions. As a condition for exempting funds from laws prohib-
iting the sale of new issues by advisors and affiliates to their funds,
advisors' may be required to recapture whenever feasible. Because
recapture is available only to purchasers who are members of a
syndicate or selling group, funds engaging in recapture arguably
receive a sales concession or a discount that is unavailable to others.
The SEC consequently should consider the abolition of fixed under-
writing commissions. This would provide all large purchasers, not
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just mutual funds, with the ability to take advantage of the econom-
ies of scale created by large transactions. In the interim, the SEC
and the NASD should consider whether fund advisors are receiving
benefits from practices such as designated orders at the expense of
their funds.
